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Abstract 
 
Online retailers have increasingly adopted product 
recommendation systems as an effective tool to 
improve product visibility and promote sales. This 
study examines the impact of the recommendation 
system in the popular Google Play mobile app store. 
By analyzing a 60-day panel dataset with 235,638 
observations from 9,735 apps, we investigate how the 
characteristics of the recommended apps relative to 
those of the focal apps affect the adoption of mobile 
apps in this volatile market. Our results show that the 
relative strength of the recommended apps over the 
focal app plays a key role in influencing the outcome of 
recommendations. Moreover, the heterogeneity of the 
recommendations as represented by the diversity of the 
popularity of the recommended apps is positively 
associated with a more even distribution of revenue in 
the market. These findings provide insights for mobile 
app market operators to enhance the design of their 
recommendation systems. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The market for mobile devices has undergone a 
rapid growth in the last few years with an equally 
remarkable increase in the development and use of 
mobile apps [1]. With statistics showing that mobile 
users install up to 40 apps and on average spend 2 
hours daily using these apps [2], it is not surprising to 
see that the revenue for mobile apps has reached $89 
billion in 2016 and is projected to exceed $189 billion 
by 2020 [3].  
As the leading mobile platform, the Android market 
has reportedly taken up more than 86% of the market 
share and attracted thousands of software developers to 
develop mobile apps on this platform [4]. The large 
number and diversity of apps available in this market 
and the constant evolution of the Android platform 
have made it challenging for most users to choose 
which apps to install and for the platform administrator 
to design effective mechanisms to promote their apps 
[5]. In the mobile market, apps are primarily 
distributed through centralized marketplaces such as 
Android’s Google Play Store and Apple’s App Store. 
A mobile app marketplace is an online platform where 
users can download and update applications to increase 
the utility and productivity of their mobile devices [6]. 
As a convenient venue for developers to publish and 
advertise their apps, a centralized marketplace has 
significantly contributed to the diffusion and adoption 
of mobile apps. However, the recent explosive growth 
of the number of mobile apps has substantially 
changed the competitive landscape in these 
marketplaces. By March 2017, the number of apps on 
Google Play has surpassed 2.8 million and is growing 
rapidly daily [3].  
Previous studies suggest that unlike most e-
commerce websites, Google Play is a superstar market 
favoring mostly popular apps [7]. Due to potential 
network effects and herd behavior [8], consumers 
generally go after apps from well-known developers or 
apps that have successfully established their reputation 
in the market, leading to a self-reinforcing loop in 
which the strong gets stronger and the weak gets 
weaker [1]. Small and new app developers often find it 
challenging to compete against these dominating 
players. Even if they develop disruptively innovative 
apps, their ideas will soon get implemented by the 
large app tycoons before they can gain the momentum 
they deserve. 
In light of the characteristics of the mobile app 
market, consumers have increasingly relied on other 
information to identify the apps that meet their needs. 
Among the various factors that help a mobile app stand 
out in the fierce competition, product visibility has 
been found to play a critical role in improving the 
exposure and acceptance of a mobile app [5], [9]. In 
most electronic markets, product reviews and 
recommendation systems have been implemented to 
facilitate the product search process and enhance the 
visibility of the product [10]. In the mobile app market, 
similar approaches have been adopted. Product reviews 
provide an objective assessment of the quality and 
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features of the app, while the recommendation system 
facilitates and expedites decision making when a user 
is overwhelmed with multitude of choices [10]–[12]. 
The recommendation system can draw users’ attention 
toward under-exposed or niche apps that they would 
have hardly noticed on their own [13], which is 
analogous to the shelf placement strategy adopted in 
brick and mortar retailing [14] and the concepts of 4P 
and 3C widely examined in the marketing literature 
[15], [16]. In doing so, the market creates a vast 
network of apps that are inter-connected via 
recommendations, essentially forming clusters of apps 
based on their similar characteristics.  
Despite that recommendation mechanisms have 
long been implemented in the mobile app market, little 
is known about the performance and outcome of such 
mechanisms. Given the vastly abundant choices and 
much lower marginal cost of adoption (relative to that 
of a physical goods) in the mobile market, it remains 
unknown whether consumers are following the 
recommendations and, if so, whether the use of such 
systems are making the search process more efficient 
for consumers and profit-enhancing for the platform 
operators.  
Since very little empirical research has been 
conducted on the impact of the recommendation 
systems in the mobile market, in this research we focus 
on empirically analyzing the content-based 
recommendation system adopted by the largest app 
store in the mobile market - the Google Play store, and 
examining whether the recommendation system alters 
the market structure and shapes the competitive 
dynamics in this leading mobile app market. 
Specifically, our study seeks to answer the 
following questions: 
1. Does the recommendation system increase the 
overall adoption of mobile apps in the market? 
2. How do the differences in various app 
characteristics (i.e., review rating, number of 
downloads, popularity) between the focal app 
and the recommended apps influence the 
outcome of the recommendations - i.e. do they 
boost or overshadow the adoption of either the 
focal apps or the recommended apps, or both?  
3. How does the heterogeneity of the app 
recommendations change the distribution of the 
app downloads and the equality (or inequality) 
of the mobile app market? 
To answer these questions, we briefly review the 
related literature and present our theory and research 
hypotheses, followed by a description of our data and 
research methodology. Then we summarize the results 
from the empirical analysis and conclude the paper 
with directions for future research.   
2. Theoretical background  
 
In recent years, the growing literature on mobile app 
has examined various technical, social and business 
aspects of this emerging ecosystem to understand 
factors that lead to the prosperity of the market. 
Valuable insights can be drawn from examining market 
characteristics such as app acquisition and usage (i.e. 
[17], popularity trends (e.g. [1]), determinants of 
success (e.g. [9]), and revenue strategies (e.g. [5]). 
Among these themes, revenue models and success 
factors of mobile apps have been key topics of interest 
in the mobile app literature due to their impact on 
profits [6]. Since the creation of the market, platform 
operators and a lot of the mobile app developers have 
embraced a freemium revenue model that differs from 
that of the traditional software products [9]. One of the 
most important characteristics of the freemium revenue 
model is that it offers users an opportunity to try their 
apps before paying for it. Since a lot of apps can be 
personally evaluated, product review, the traditional 
indicator of product quality in the electronic markets, 
has been superseded by product visibility as the most 
critical determinant of success in the mobile app 
market [5].  With the extremely large number of apps 
available in the market and the very limited amount of 
time a user can spend on evaluating an app, catching 
the attention of the user has become a critical 
prerequisite for adoption [9].  
Platform operators such as Google and Apple have 
also realized the importance of product visibility and 
implemented different mechanisms to promote it. For 
example, both markets offer various ranking lists in 
their app stores to allow users to browse a variety of 
apps based on app category or their recent popularity. 
In addition, a set of similar apps are recommended to 
users as they are browsing an app that shares some 
similar features. Theoretically, these recommendations 
should improve the overall exposure of the apps in the 
market and provide more competing opportunities for 
less well-known apps. However, Google Play has been 
found to produce a “winner-take-all” market outcome 
[7], where 10% of all apps reportedly received 70% to 
90% of all downloads [1], a result that contradicts the 
prediction derived from other long tail markets that 
also exhibit extensive product variety and low search 
cost [9]. This phenomenon leads us to investigate how 
the app recommendations work in the mobile market 
and if they are playing the same role that has been 
documented in other markets.  
A recommendation system is a computer-mediated 
system configured to form a large web of inter-
connected products to help consumers find a product 
that meets their requirements and/or encourage them to 
purchase additional products to achieve cross-selling 
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[12], [18]. When the recommendation system is 
implemented, each product in this network is 
connected to a group of products that share similar 
attributes and the network position of each product, as 
determined by the number of its incoming and 
outgoing links, affects the overall product demand 
[19]. These recommendation systems have recently 
become popular in online environments, such as social 
media, e-commerce and mobile app markets [20]. They 
have been shown to increase product sales, product 
diversity, customer satisfaction, and customer loyalty, 
as well as providing a better understanding of customer 
needs [21], [22].  
The use of online recommendation systems has 
been examined extensively in the literature. Several 
studies have focused on the recommendation system on 
Amazon.com since it is one of the most successful 
implementations of the recommendation systems [18], 
[20]. These studies examine the co-purchase 
recommendation system on Amazon Bookstore using 
either SNA (Social Network Analysis) or PageRank as 
the measure of importance for each product page [10], 
[14], [19]. In general, they found that the position of a 
product on the recommendation network affects its 
overall demand. Extending these studies, Lin et al. [18] 
examine the role of both incoming and outgoing links 
on product demand on the co-purchase network of 
Tmall, a popular Chinese ecommerce website. The 
authors found that the diversity and stability of the 
outgoing links decrease the demand for the focal 
product (the anchor product based on which the 
recommendations are made). 
 Building on these work, in this paper we analyze a 
similar recommendation system in the Google Play 
mobile app market. In particular, instead of using the 
standard network measures such as income or outgoing 
links adopted in the extant literature, we will 
characterize the relative position of an app in a 
recommended network through directly measuring the 
differences between the focal app and the associated 
recommended app in terms of their key characteristics 
such as quality and popularity, which is an approach 
that has not been used in other studies. 
Moreover, in addition to influencing the demand 
for an app, the use of the recommendation system can 
potentially change the market structure, which in turn, 
transform the competitive dynamics. Prior studies have 
applied the theory of Long Tail to determine the impact 
of product recommendations on market concentration 
[7], [14]. Their findings indicate that the use of 
recommendation system positively affects the long tail 
distribution and consequently the market structure.  
Given these findings, we attempt to go beyond the 
long tail distribution and examine whether the use of 
the recommendation system improves the 
competitiveness of the relatively newer and less well-
known apps in the market.  To this end, we will use the 
Gini Coefficient [23] to examine the download 
distribution within the mobile app market. Gini 
Coefficient, originally introduced as a measure of 
inequality in income distribution, has often been used 
to study demand and revenue distribution. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, we will generate the Lorenz 
Curve for each app category and calculate the 
corresponding Gini Coefficient using the number of 
downloads computed from the app’s sales rank. Then, 
we will examine the relationship between the diversity 
of the app recommendations and the Gini Coefficient 
within each app category to determine if a more 
diverse recommendation portfolio reduces the 
inequality in the mobile app market.  
 
Figure 1.  Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient in 
mobile app market 
In summary, although the impact of 
recommendation systems in e-commerce has been 
widely studied, to the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study that investigates the role of recommendation 
systems in mobile app market. Furthermore, by 
proposing our unique angles on the direct competition 
between the focal app and the recommendations, and 
on the distribution of app adoption, our study will 
provide important theoretical and practical guidance on 
how the design of the recommendation system can lead 
to a more sustainable growth of the mobile app market. 
3. Hypotheses and theory development  
 
As the official market for the popular Android 
platform, Google Play offers a homepage for each app 
that displays a wide range of information such as app 
title, description, version, review rating, rating count, 
number of installs, and developer information. More 
importantly, regardless of the device used to access the 
app’s homepage, Google Play shows a list of “Similar” 
apps that share some common features with the app 
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being viewed (the focal app). This essentially creates a 
network of recommendations that customers can use to 
compare apps and identify the app that best meets their 
search criteria.  
Given that consumers will be able to see the 
recommended apps that otherwise would have been 
difficult to discover, the recommendation effectively 
increases the visibility of a mobile app and the 
probability of download. A good recommendation 
system in an app store can update the recommended 
list dynamically based on the constantly-changing 
market trends and shifting user preferences, creating a 
more vibrant market where even less well-known 
developers and less popular apps also have a chance to 
compete for user attention and actual downloads. 
Therefore, consistent with the findings of the prior 
studies that examine the effect of recommendation 
system on demand or revenue, we expect that there is a 
positive relationship between the frequency of 
presence on the recommendation list and the sales 
performance of the app: 
H1: All else being equal, the frequency of the 
recommendations is positively associated with the 
sales performance of a mobile app. 
In addition to the boosting effect on the 
recommended app’s sales performance, the presence of 
the recommendations also leads to a direct competition 
between the focal app and the recommended apps. In 
electronic markets, product canalization [20] often 
occurs when multiple listings are simultaneously 
competing for the limited time and attention a shopper 
can devote in the product search process. A central 
question of interest is that, does the use of the 
recommendation system lead to a zero-sum game in 
which the sales of the recommended apps increases at 
the expense of the decreasing sales of the focal app, or 
does the use the recommendation system increase the 
overall demand for all similar products across the 
market due to the positive spillover effect? 
The extant literature has largely addressed these 
questions at the market level, with specific focuses on 
how the network structure of the recommendation 
systems affects the outcome of the recommendations 
[14], [18], [19]. However, we adopt a different 
perspective in this study as we choose to focus on the 
individual app level rather than at the market level. We 
believe that mobile users on average can only spend 
very limited amount of time search for apps and the 
effect of recommendations occurs locally only among 
the apps that have been exposed to the user. Therefore, 
we expect the answers to these questions vary across 
apps and depend critically on the criteria of the 
comparison that are of the most importance to mobile 
app consumers. We argue that the relative outcome of 
the recommendations to be moderated by the nature of 
the competition, as driven by the comparison between 
the characteristics of the apps. Specifically, when the 
focal app has a relatively lower perceived quality (as 
reflected in their review rating), or are less well-
received by consumers (as reflected in their number of 
downloads) relative to the apps being recommended, 
there is a greater chance that a consumer will choose 
the recommended app over the focal app, resulting in a 
cannibalization of the focal app. Conversely, if the 
focal app outperforms the recommended app in terms 
of either perceived quality or user adoption, the 
recommended apps will have little impact on the 
adoption of the focal app. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that: 
H2a: All else being equal, the effect of 
recommendation is stronger when the recommended 
apps have higher average quality than the focal app. 
H2b: All else being equal, the effect of 
recommendation is stronger when the recommended 
apps have lower average price than the focal app. 
H2c: All else being equal, the effect of 
recommendation is stronger when the recommended 
apps enjoy higher average number of downloads 
compared to the focal app. 
Other than influencing the adoption of the apps, the 
presence of the recommendation system can present a 
wider range of options to consumers, leading to a 
greater diversity in consumer’s choice set. Studies had 
suggested that app stores exhibit a spillover effect that 
causes users to download multiple apps at the same 
time [1], even if some of them are not the ones that the 
user was originally searching for. Heterogeneous 
recommendations can lead to a greater extent of 
diversity both within and across category. This can 
encourage developers to diversify their app portfolio, 
and users can be exposed to niche app categories that 
are under-promoted. Therefore, based on similar 
research of product heterogeneity in electronic markets 
[18], we expect that, when the characteristics of the 
recommended apps are more diverse, which happens 
when apps from different price levels and different 
popularity levels are being recommended, it will result 
in a more evenly distributed impact of the 
recommendation system. Such heterogeneity will also 
help the minority apps in the market and potentially 
reverse the self-reinforcing loop that makes the strong 
grow stronger. Hence, we predict that: 
H3a: Heterogeneity in the prices of the recommended 
apps is negatively associated with the inequality in the 
adoption of the mobile apps. 
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H3b: Heterogeneity in the popularity of the 
recommended apps is negatively associated with the 
inequality in the adoption of the mobile apps. 
 
4. Data and research methodology 
  
4.1. Sample characteristics  
 
To test our hypotheses, we collected data from ten 
different app categories from the Google Play store on 
a daily basis for 60 consecutive days between 
November 2nd, 2016 and Dec 31st, 2016. Being the 
largest and the only official app store for the leading 
Android mobile platform, Google Play presents a 
unique opportunity to study the dynamics in the mobile 
app market. Using an automatic software agent, we 
collected detailed app level data such as app id, 
download rank, app categories, price, review rating, 
number of reviews, developer, the range of downloads, 
app type (paid vs. free), app features, app version, 
release date, in-app purchases, and the same set of data 
for a set of recommended apps. The final dataset 
consists of 235,638 observations in 60 days, covering 
9,735 focal apps that appeared on our selected ranking 
lists and 42,977 apps that appeared on these focal apps’ 
recommended lists.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of key variables 
Variable Mean Std.  Min. Max. 
Download 
Range 7042242.52 55676380.16 1 1000000000 
PaidApp  0.42 0.49 0 1 
Rank 231.09 149.72 1 504 
TopRank 
Freqeuency 12.23 21.64 1 59 
Rating 4.17 0.56 1 5 
RatingCount 234042.48 1898984.204 1 57526695 
Price 4.54 7.01 0 124.99 
InApp 
Purchase 4.26 8.39 0.99 199.99 
RecomApp 
Rating 4.18 0.51 1 5 
RecomApp 
Price 5.12 10.36 0.01 299.99 
*The statistics for download range is generated using the lower 
bound of the download range. 
 
The dataset consists 4,480 (46.02%) free apps and 
5,255 (53.98%) paid apps. A summary of the 
descriptive statistics of the data are shown in Table 1.  
We chose to collect and analyze daily app data as 
the recommendations change daily and their effect 
takes place in real time. When an app is removed from 
the recommendation list, consumers may not see the 
app anymore and they cannot follow the link to 
examine it further. Hence, a daily longitudinal dataset 
allows us to effectively capture the impact of the 
recommendation system. 
4.2. Estimating the number of downloads 
 
In the literature, the sales performance variable (the 
dependent variable for H1, H2a, H2b, and H2c) has 
been measured by both the download rank and the 
actual number of downloads. The download rank data 
are readily available on Google Play and were 
collected by our software agent and included in the 
dataset. However, even though some prior studies have 
found that there exists an inverse relationship between 
sales rank and actual sales, which can be used to 
recover the sales data [24], others have argued that the 
validity of this approach depends on the assumption 
that the sales rank is computed from the actual sales 
figures [25]. Since this assumption is difficult to verify 
in the Google Play market where ranking algorithm 
remains largely unknown1[25], [26], we decided to use 
the number of download as the measure for a mobile 
app’s sales performance and only use the rank variable 
as an independent variable. 
Given this measurement choice, the next issue we 
need to address is that Google Play does not publish 
the exact number of downloads and only provides 
statistics on the range of the number of downloads (i.e., 
100-500, 500-1000, 1,000-5,000, …, etc.), which 
presents a great challenge on our data analysis. Upon 
monitoring the data published in the Google Play store, 
we found that due to high consumer demand for mobile 
apps, a substantial number of apps move from one 
download range to the other within a relatively short 
period of time (i.e., a couple weeks or even a few days 
in some popular app categories). This important 
observation leads us to conduct a separate analysis to 
recover the number of downloads for the apps in our 
sample. Specifically, we scanned through the entire 
sample and identified dates on which a particular app 
moved from one download range to the next level. For 
example, if an app moved from the “500 to 1000” 
download category to the “1000 to 5000” download 
category on Nov 15, 2016, then we can confidently 
infer that this particular app has received at least 1000 
cumulative downloads by Nov 15. In other words, by 
monitoring changes in the download category on given 
                                                 
1 Unlike other e-retailers, Google Play does not rank its apps solely 
based on download numbers. Factors such as rating, rating counts, 
and retention rate have all been found to influence the rank. 
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dates, we are able to recover the cumulative number of 
downloads for a subset of the apps in our dataset.2  
Next, given that it has been widely established that 
there exists a positive correlation between the number 
of downloads and the number of reviews for products 
in electronic markets [7], [27], which we fully expect 
to be carried over to the mobile app market, we can 
uncover the relationship between the number of 
downloads and the number of reviews (labeled as 
ratingCount in Table 1). Once we obtain this 
parameter, we can generalize the relationship to the 
rest of the observations in our sample for which we 
only have the number of reviews.   
Based on the above description, we constructed a 
separate dataset that consists of 1,358 apps (14% of the 
total number of apps we have in our sample) for which 
we identified the exact download number of downloads 
due to the change in download ranges. Then, we 
estimated the predicted relationship by regressing the 
actual number of downloads on the number of reviews, 
controlling for factors such as app type (free vs. paid), 
app popularity, app category, etc. Since the 
relationship between the number of downloads and the 
number of reviews may change as more users adopt the 
app, we divided the apps in our sample into three 
categories: low, medium, and high, based on their 
popularity. These three dummy variables are multiplied 
with the number of review variable to form three 
interaction terms. As a result of this model 
specification, the coefficients for these interacting 
variables represent the proposed relationship for apps 
in these specific categories. 
We ran both OLS and a fixed-effect estimation on 
the proposed model. The OLS estimator served as a 
baseline case while the fixed-effect model was 
introduced to examine if there are any systematic 
differences due to factors not captured by our model. 
Table 2 presents the results of both regressions. 
Table 2 shows that both models have good 
explanatory power over the proposed relationship. In 
particular, the three interaction terms that involved the 
key independent variable, ratingCount (number of 
reviews) were all significant in both models, indicating 
that there exists a strong positive relationship between 
the number of downloads and the number of reviews, 
and this relationship differs slightly across different 
types of apps (low, medium and high popularity) as 
expected. To determine which model gives us the best 
                                                 
2 We tried to minimize the potential bias by collecting the data at the 
same time (midnight) each day. By doing so, we allow for the same 
time interval for downloads to accumulate. Therefore, even though 
download numbers could change at any time, the number collected 
reflects the number of downloads received within a constant 24-hour 
time window. In addition, there is relatively fewer downloads at 
midnight, further reducing any possible data discrepancy. 
approximation, we applied the coefficients of the three 
interaction terms back to the subsample which has the 
actual number of downloads. It turned out that the OLS 
estimates yielded the closest approximation to the true 
data. Hence the coefficients obtained from the OLS 
regression were used to compute the number of 
downloads for the rest of our sample.  
Table 2: Number of downloads regression results* 
Dependent variable 
Number of Downloads 
Model 1 
(OLS) 
Model 2 
(Fixed Effect) 
PaidApp  -838.06* -9.11* 
Price  1268.06** 148.15 
Rating  34.52 15.56 
RatingCount*Low 5.37** 2.57* 
RatingCount*Med  8.26** 3.82* 
RatingCount*High  18.38** 3.48** 
Fit Statistics (n=1,781) 0.81 (Adjusted R2) 
24.02*  
(F Stat) 
*p<5%,**p<1%. 
It is likely that the relationship between the number 
of downloads and the number of reviews also depends 
on other factors not captured by our model. However, 
given the high adjusted R square (0.81) in the OLS 
regression. We are confident that the set of parameter 
estimates we adopted provide a very good 
approximation to the true data and can be safely 
generalized to the entire sample.  
4.3. Estimation method 
 
Having obtained the number of downloads for all of 
the apps in our dataset, we proceeded to test H1 
through H2c. To improve the validity of our results, we 
took the difference of the number of downloads 
variable and used these difference as our dependent 
variable. This procedure ensures that we are examining 
the changes in the number of downloads as a result of 
changes in the independent variables of our interest, 
and not their effects on the cumulative number of 
downloads (which could be influenced by a number of 
variables that were at work before the data collection 
time frame). 
Since our dataset contains both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal data, it lends itself to estimators 
specifically designed for panel datasets. Following the 
well-established approach in econometrics [5], we 
addressed these issues by adopting the Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS) estimator with corrections for 
both cross-panel heteroscedasticity and within-panel 
autocorrelation. These corrections were incorporated 
because a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for 
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heteroskedasticity yields a high χ2 across panels, 
indicating the presence of systematic variation across 
different app categories. Moreover, the Wooldridge 
test for autocorrelation also shows that substantial first-
order autocorrelation (AR1) is present in our dataset, 
which is not surprising given the daily nature of the 
sample. 
To test H1, we regressed the differenced number of 
downloads on the frequency of recommendations as 
measured by the number of times this app appears on 
other apps’ recommendation lists, controlling for 
random effects such as price, review rating, and fixed 
effects such as app category and developer.  
To test H2a through H2c, a comparison between 
each focal app and all of its recommended apps was 
conducted with regard to the difference in app rating, 
price, and the number of downloads. Then, the same 
dependent variable used in H1 will be regressed on the 
differences of review rating, price and app download 
number, controlling for a similar set of factors as used 
in testing H1. Note that for H2c, we are testing the 
influence of the total download numbers on a user’s 
comparison between the focal app and the 
recommended app, hence the computed number of 
downloads was used instead of the difference in 
downloads, as the total number of download is a better 
measure for the popularity of a mobile app. 
Finally, to test H3a and H3b, we focused on 
examining the degree of inequality in the adoption of 
paid mobile apps within different app categories. We 
decided to focus on paid apps only because the 
traditional measure of market inequality is based on 
income or revenue, whereas free apps do not generate 
upfront revenue and we were not able to observe the 
other revenue streams such as in-app purchases or 
advertising income through public sources. Hence, we 
limit our analysis to paid mobile apps only for which 
we can compute the revenue using their price 
multiplied by the number of downloads. 
We set our unit of analysis at the category level 
instead of the market level for several reasons. First, 
Google Play is the largest mobile app market in the 
world and it is technically impossible to collect a 
sufficiently large sample to capture the true extent of 
revenue distribution in the market. Second, apps differ 
significantly in terms of their adoption across different 
categories (e.g., games enjoy far more downloads than 
a references app). Hence it is not meaningful to 
compare app adoption across different categories. 
Finally, we selected categories for which Google 
publishes the top categorical ranking list. This 
sampling approach allows us to include a 
representative body of the apps in the category and 
apply a common measure (i.e., categorical rank) to 
compare the adoption of similar apps. 
To measure the dependent variable for H3a and 
H3b, the degree of heterogeneity in the prices and 
quality of the recommended apps, we computed the 
standard deviation of these variables for each focal 
app. Then we took the average of these standard 
deviations for all focal apps within the same category, 
which allows us to assess the category-level 
heterogeneity among all the recommendations. 
4.4. Gini-coefficient 
 
The key independent variable for H3a and H3b is 
the inequality of app adoption in a given category. 
Following Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan [14], 
we computed the within-category Gini coefficient 
based on the Lorenz curve [23], a well-established 
measure for income distribution in a given population. 
In our analysis, the horizontal axis of the Lorenz curve 
is the (ascending) ranking order (in percentile) of a 
mobile app’s revenue (which is obtained from price 
multiplied by the number of downloads) within each 
app category, and the vertical axis is the cumulative 
app revenue as a fraction of the total revenue for all 
app up to the associated rank order.  
More specifically, if we rank apps N= {1, 2, 3, ..., 
n} into an ascending percentile ρ, where 0 < ρ ≤ 1, and 
compute the revenue as a percentile y(ρ) of the 
cumulative revenue. Then the Lorenz curve can be 
plotted as a function of L(ρ, y(ρ).). Accordingly, Gini 
Coefficient will be computed as twice the area between 
the Lorenz curve and the diagonal line (the line of 
equality) that starts from the origin and ends at the 
upper right corner with coordinates (1, 1). The higher 
the Gini-Coefficient, the higher the inequality in the 
market and the larger the shaded area. In contrast, 
when the market has no disparity, which happens when 
everyone receives the same revenue, the Lorenz curve 
will overlap with the diagonal line of equality, 
resulting in a zero value for the Gini-Coefficient and 
no shaded area in Figure 1. 
Upon generating the values for both the dependent 
variable and independent variable, we ran a similar 
GLS regression on our data, with a specification for 
fixed-effects. This specification is adopted as all of the 
data points generated for this analysis are at the app 
category level and the category characteristics are 
likely to have a strong impact on the predicted 
relationship between the dependent variable and 
independent variable. 
 
5. Results  
We summarized the results of the two different 
regressions in Table 3. The independent variables used 
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are listed on the left column, and the two columns on 
the right correspond to the two different models used to 
test the three sets of hypotheses. Note that unit of 
analysis also differs across these two models. H1 and 
H2a through H2c were tested at the app level and H3a 
and H3b were tested at the app category level. 
Table 3: Number of downloads regression results* 
Hypotheses Tested: H1, H2a – 
H2c 
H3a and H3b 
Dependent Variables: Difference in 
Number of 
downloads 
Gini-
Coefficient 
Constant 45.59** .021** 
RecomFrequency (H1)    .92 ** N/A 
Price  -15.08 .0317** 
Rating     30.63* .0044 
Rank   -55.93** .0005** 
Paid (binary) -8.26** N/A 
RecomRatingDiff (H2a) 13.14** N/A 
RecomPriceDiff (H2b) 2.52 N/A 
RecomDownloadDiff (H2c) 0.0085** N/A 
Hetergeneity in Price (H3a) N/A 0.18* 
Hetergeneity in Downloads 
(H3b) N/A -0.0073
** 
Estimator GLS (RE) GLS (FE) 
Fit Statistics  912.10** (χ2) 44.02** (F Stat) 
*p<5%, **p<1%. The coefficients for control variables are 
omitted due to space limit. 
The middle column of Table 3 shows that there is a 
strong positive relationship between the frequency of 
recommendation and the daily incremental downloads, 
and that the effect of recommendation is significantly 
stronger when the recommended apps have a higher 
review rating, or when they have a higher number of 
downloads than the focal app, thus supporting H1, H2a 
and H2c.  
Surprisingly, the price difference between the focal 
app and the recommended app does not seem have a 
significant influence on the number of downloads, 
suggesting that H2b is not supported.  
A further examination of the coefficient obtained 
from the regression shows that, for an average app, 
each additional appearance on the recommendation list 
is associated with .92 more daily downloads. It is 
worth noting that this number only represents the 
medium effect for an app with average characteristics. 
This number is expected to be higher for apps that are 
on the top-ranking list or with a higher rating, and 
lower for apps that are not as popular or have a low 
review rating. In addition, a one unit difference 
between the recommended app’s review rating and that 
of the focal app is associated with 13.14 more 
downloads for the recommended app, whereas each 
1000 download number difference is associated with 
8.5 more downloads for the recommended app.  
With regard to hypotheses H3a and H3b. The right 
column in Table 3 indicates that only the coefficient 
estimate for the heterogeneity in the download 
numbers of the recommended apps is significant and 
helps to reduce the revenue disparity in the mobile app 
market, thus supporting hypothesis H3b. The 
coefficient for the price heterogeneity variable has the 
negative sign and is not significant, thus rejecting H3a. 
To provide an overview of the results of our analysis, 
we summarized the outcome of the hypotheses testing 
in Table 4. 
Table 4: Number of downloads regression results* 
Hypothesized Relationship Result 
H1: Higher frequency of recommendation 
leads to more downloads Supported 
H2a: the effect of recommendation is 
stronger when the recommended apps have 
higher average quality than the focal app 
Supported 
H2b: the effect of recommendation is 
stronger when the recommended apps have 
lower average price than the focal app 
Not 
Supported 
H2c: the effect of recommendation is 
stronger when the recommended apps have 
higher average downloads than the focal app 
Supported 
H3a: Greater heterogeneity in the prices of 
the recommended apps leads to lower Gini-
Coefficient (more equal distribution). 
Not 
Supported 
(reverse sign) 
H3b: Greater heterogeneity in the popularity 
of the recommended apps leads to lower 
Gini-Coefficient (more equal distribution). 
Supported 
 
6. Discussion 
 
The results presented in the preceding section reveal 
interesting dynamics in the Google Play market where 
a mobile app recommendation system is implemented. 
Consistent with our theoretical conjecture, the presence 
of the app recommendations leads to more downloads 
of the recommended apps. Such a boosting effect is 
stronger when the recommended apps have higher 
review rating or download numbers than the focal app, 
suggesting that mobile app users do not simply follow 
the recommendations provided by Google Play. 
Instead, they carefully take advantage of the rich 
information available on the app’s homepage before 
making their adoption decision. Moreover, among the 
various kinds of information present on the 
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recommended list, price is not a dominant factor when 
mobile users compare the recommended apps with the 
focal app, which is contrary to what we hypothesized.  
These findings confirm that the impact of the 
recommendation system is equally evident in the 
mobile app market as in other electronic markets. More 
importantly, offering a recommendation list may not be 
sufficient to maximize all the potential of the 
recommendation system. Based on the findings of our 
research, platform administrators should facilitate the 
comparison of the key characteristics such as review 
rating and the number of downloads between the focal 
app and the recommended app, as doing so will 
significantly leverage the power of the 
recommendation system. 
Our results also show that the choice of the 
recommended apps can significantly influence the 
disparity of mobile app adoption in the market, 
especially within certain app categories. Specifically, 
recommending apps in different stages of their 
lifecycle helps to improve the visibility of these 
otherwise under-promoted apps. The support for H3b 
also indicates that these low visibility app may benefit 
more from being recommended by the platform than 
those superstar apps do, who most likely have already 
occupied a spot on one of the top-ranking list, or has 
been advertised heavily through other communication 
channels. If the objective of a platform administrator is 
to provide a marketplace with a more competitive 
environment and foster the sustainable growth of the 
market, they should try to promote these relatively 
young and less well-established apps and their 
developers to ensure that they will not be forced to exit 
the market due to the dominating apps attracting the 
majority of user attention in the market.  
Furthermore, our results also indicate that the 
heterogeneity in the prices of the recommended app 
does not seem to have the expected influence on the 
revenue distribution in the market. This is consistent 
with the lack of support for H2b and shows that price is 
not the most important determinant in the mobile app 
market. Due to the relatively low prices of mobile 
apps, and more importantly, the wide availability of 
free apps, it is possible that mobile app users can easily 
find free apps that meet their needs, or find a needed 
paid app that offers the free version for them to trial. In 
either case, they don’t have to sacrifice quality or use 
experience in return for a small savings in app price. 
This result, if proved to be true in similar mobile app 
markets, will have a profound impact on the 
developer’s app promotion strategy, as they will have 
to focus on other product dimensions beyond price, 
which has traditionally been a key determinant of 
competition. 
7. Conclusion and future research 
Online retailers have increasingly relied on the use 
of recommendation systems to improve product 
visibility and promote sales. This study empirically 
examines the effect of recommendation system in the 
leading Google Play mobile app market, which is 
uniquely characterized with its multitude of app 
choices and the prevailing use of the recommendation 
system. We collect daily app data from the Google 
Play store and constructed a 60-day panel dataset that 
includes a wide range of data on app recommendations 
and their market performance. This rich dataset allows 
us to examine how the competition between the focal 
app and its recommendations affects their relative 
adoptions, and how the heterogeneity of the 
recommendations influences market inequality.  
Our research will contribute to both practices and 
research in the increasingly popular mobile app 
domain, which has intrinsically different characteristics 
from other e-commerce markets in terms of reaction, 
flexibility, competition and product portfolio [9]. From 
an academic perspective, our study extends the 
recommendation systems literature and introduces the 
new angle of competition within recommendation 
system and inequality of adoption to the mobile app 
ecosystem. The new approach we developed to recover 
the actual number of downloads from a subset of the 
data observed in the market has important theoretical 
and empirical implications on research in electronic 
markets where actual sales data are difficult to obtain 
From a practical standpoint, the result of our study 
will provide insights for mobile app market operators 
to enhance the design of their recommendation systems 
and provide tangible measures to evaluate the 
performance of these systems. Our findings can also 
benefit the developers to by providing them a better 
understanding of the competition and guidance on how 
to focus their efforts in areas that can best leverage 
their competitive advantages.   
To the best of our knowledge, our study is among 
the first to empirically examine the impact of 
recommendation systems in the mobile app market. 
The results of our study open up a new arena for future 
research. It will be interesting to examine whether the 
use of the recommendation system leads to a zero-sum 
game in which the recommended apps gain market 
share at the cost of the focal apps, or whether it leads to 
a market expansion in which more downloads are 
achieved for both focal and recommended apps, or how 
superstar or highly rated recommended apps may 
influence app downloads, as all are questions of great 
importance to mobile app market stake holders. 
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